INSEAD

Managing Information in Humanitarian Crises:

The UNJLC Website

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Introduction

In late September 2004 the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre's (UNJLC) quarterly meeting took place in Copenhagen, providing one of the rare occasions in which a large part of the team would convene. In addition to reviewing recent deployments, the direction of forthcoming operations and activities was also on the agenda.

Along the corridors nearby the conference room one could hear field officers energetically swapping stories about the remote places from which they had just returned, and the challenges they faced. Some had just returned from Sudan, Iraq, and others as far as Haiti. Regardless of telecommunications and periodic reports, nothing could replace the quality and feel of these face-to-face meetings that so rarely take place.

As the meeting time approached, you could still hear people asking questions to fill gaps about stories they had heard from the field. Others were getting advice in preparation for their next destination from those who just returned.

UNJLC: Coordinating Humanitarian Logistics

The concept of the UNJLC was born out of the humanitarian response to the 1996 Eastern Zaire crisis, which had demanded intensified coordination and pooling of vehicles and trucks among United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)[1]. The concept was subsequently applied to other UNJLC interventions in Somalia, Kosovo, East Timor, Mozambique, Bhuj, Afghanistan, Liberia, Haiti and Sudan (see Exhibit A). In March 2002, the UNJLC was given the status of a UN humanitarian response mechanism, under the aegis of WFP, by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG).

A core UNJLC team was then established in Rome. It was given the status of an inter-agency unit, with technical and administrative support provided by its host agency, WFP. The core team in Rome contributed actively towards aligning the logistics needs of the different agencies, providing input into inter-agency contingency plans, and advising on inter-agency logistics coordination during emergencies.

The UNJLC's mission was to complement and coordinate the logistics capabilities of humanitarian agencies during large-scale emergencies[2]. The UNJLC was a facility – rather than a UN agency – that could be activated when intense inter-agency coordination was

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[1] For more information see INSEAD Case Study No. 05/2003-5092 "United Nations Joint Logistics Centre: The Afghanistan Crisis"

[2] The UNJLC is deployed by the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) when it is deemed that logistics activities will make up a significant part of the operation. Its role is not to carry on a program but to coordinate the activities of the organisations involved, primarily with information brokerage. Decision for deployment is taken within 24 hours of the onset of a crisis, and deployment takes place within 48 hours of the decision. Staffing is primarily done through seconded staff from other humanitarian agencies within the UN system.

necessary in the field. Once mobilized, the UNJLC worked towards the widest possible participation among humanitarian logistics actors and facilitated the interface with non-humanitarian entities (such as the military).

Information Provider: The Challenges

The UNJLC had designed a website[3] for the humanitarian community operating at disaster sites where the UNJLC had been deployed. UNJLC deployment could assume two different models: coordination only, or coordination plus asset management.[4] In each case the website would reflect the model. In the first, the core activity in the deployment was Information Management (IM) to support negotiations and common activities. This could be something as simple as communicating which items will be traveling on which flights with their arrival times and details. They could also post information on the transportation prices from various locations so that humanitarian organizations would have a reference point when contracting services. At the same time they could find out who else would be interested in using that route and perhaps share vehicles as it happened in Afghanistan. In contrast to the first model, the second uses IM to report how UNJLC has managed assets (vehicles, airplanes, helicopters, warehouses, etc) to mobilize goods, or people as it was the case when UNJLC ran airlift operations during the Mozambique floods for airlifted victims.

In both cases the website provided a platform for information exchange that could facilitate the logistics of all involved in responding to the disaster. It would also publish simple data about the accessibility of entry points and their particular requirements for customs; security updates on the corridors, weather conditions, attacks or conflicts; location and rates of transportation providers; warehousing availability and capacity along with the contact information.

One of UNJLC's main contributions was to provide timely, accurate, and relevant information that could support humanitarian agencies helping them solve bottlenecks and conflicts. In some cases this was as simple as providing contact information. At other times more sensitive material such as the security status of a particular region, curfews and regulations, had to be communicated.

> *"Our goal for the website and the reports was to keep it simple, but that was becoming increasingly difficult as more types of information reached us. We still had to understand our users and their needs before we could sort what belonged on our site,"* the UNJLC Chief Information Officer, Nigel Snoad[5] pointed out.

In emergency management, time is of the essence, so understanding users was key to deciding in which areas internal resources should be invested and prioritized. "We are more likely to succeed if we understand and address our users' needs and habits rather than expecting them to adapt to us. The latter is less likely to happen and would take too much time," Snoad

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[3]   http://www.unjlc.org

[4]   Managing assets is limited to very special cases in order to avoid interfering in the regular operations of other agencies and only occurs under specific requests from the humanitarian coordinator.

[5]   Seconded to the UNJLC Core Team by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

explained. However, he acknowledged that the speed and urgency of operations made it harder to survey users and their needs.

UNJLC Chief Operating Officer, Adrian Van der Knaap, explains that in developing information products for emergency operations you cannot wait five months until the final version its ready. You need to focus on the process and be able to provide timely information at each stage, otherwise you are not adding the most value. He points out: "At the beginning of an operation, our most important goal is to establish our credibility with our skills and expertise, and for that we need to convey good information that is relevant to all."

http://www.unjlc.org

David Kaatrud, former UNJLC Chief Officer recalled: "Afghanistan fell in our lap while we were still planning our UNJLC concept, but the events following September 11 forced us to act quickly and so we had to learn a lot of things on the run." The first version of the website was developed in Afghanistan in 2002[6] with very basic design, interface and infrastructure, but – much like the operation – the website was a learning experience.

> *"We hired a local programer who built us a website with Frontpage rather quickly. While useful in making the information public, the format quickly presented accessibility problems. For instance, in the field with a non-Explorer browser, the web links programed in javascript would take a very long time to work…and that's assuming the computer had the correct version of java installed."*

On the other hand, the website's chief function was to provide updates for field operations. UNJLC was not entirely sure who would consult the website. Smaller organizations operating with limited logistics and information capacity were among the initial group of users. Even then, the impression was that it was most useful to those at headquarters. Snoad explained:

> *"We designed it with basic and easy-to-acquire information, yet we weren't always sure of who would use it. In the beginning its value was questionable since we were reaching UN agencies that had better-developed IM systems and for whom our information was nothing new. For us, IM and the website at this stage was more of an* ad hoc *function that we still had to develop, so we relied on users from the smaller NGOs to grasp the value we were creating and expand it more."*

Nonetheless, the growth was strong. Within three months of launching, the website had 2,500 users and by May 2003 there were 7,500 users.[7] This success began to create problems:

> *"We couldn't track at that stage who visited which pages and for what type of information. Even more importantly, we had to be able to measure how we were adding value in specific areas of the operation…*

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6   Visit http://www.unjlc.org/tools/afghanistan/root/index.htm

7   While there was a limited understanding of the users and their needs, the IM team had identified repeated users from humanitarian agencies, governments, diplomatic missions, donors, media, and academia.

We knew the information was relevant from a logistics perspective. However, we estimated what would be needed, and reported information in response to bottlenecks and conflicts that our team was solving in the field along the way. We were basically anticipating demands for information based on the activities we got involved in, assuming we were at the right place, at the right time. We didn't necessarily know how our reports ranked in our audience's interests and needs."

Some of the information fit naturally on the website like maps, but even with these there were some challenges to consider. For example, after long periods of conflict, combined with harsh meteorological conditions, Afghanistan's terrain and infrastructure had been drastically affected. The maps that were available didn't necessarily reflect the changes that had taken place in the last decade, bringing their accuracy into question.

"We had to start by making sure that the roads were viable and landmarks still standing. This was not always possible seeing as most of the territory was at highly critical security levels, and there was little infrastructure or time to address the issue. We collaborated with the military forces to validate the data using their surveillance equipment and made use of the satellites imagery from the Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) to double check."

As the quote shows, data gathering and having reliable and regular access to information was an issue affecting the development of the website and its effectiveness. Most of the information published came from contacts in different field activities (air operations, fuel, security, corridor updates) and multiple organizations. A contact point or reliable source had to be established in each organization that would communicate safely with compatible means (e-mail, phone calls, faxes, etc). This was not an easy task, as Snoad said:

"We initially assumed that there was a willingness and capacity to share, yet some organizations are so overwhelmed with activities that they are unable to give an account of what they have, while others have yet to appreciate the value of sharing information or collaborating in general."

Data Collection

Van der Knaap points out that: "if we wait for others to tell us their information needs, we would be always be late and add very little value. Instead, we should rely on our team's expertise to identify what is needed and complement what others are missing. The challenge is how to disseminate well, and there we need to ask people to understand how they best access it."

In general data is either gathered from the field or external sources. A network of people collects information by going into communities. They compile readily available data speaking with locals and observing the situation. For example, staff members in the field would report about fuel prices, exchange rates, security and distances, and transportation rates. Yet there were issues about ensuring that communication (via Internet, telephone, fax etc.) was sufficiently frequent. Many also saw little personal benefit to reporting information that went

to levels in the organization above them only and that was common knowledge at their level in the field.

External information was easier to obtain provided a collaboration agreement with the source had drafted. Through partners, the website was kept up to date with weather reports, different types of maps, frameworks and legal documents, links to other agencies and information about local services. This information motivated members of the different humanitarian organizations to use the website, as useful information that was otherwise time-consuming to collect and collate on a regular basis began to appear.

First Generation: Waking up to your Audiences

In March 2003, UNJLC finished its mission in Afghanistan. Though the website had been a success, there were some doubts whether it had reached its target audience. At the time the targeted audience was field logisticians, which was a wrong assumption as experienced showed. Douglas Osmond,[8] a UNJLC Logistics Officer reflected regarding the Afghan experience that:

> *"Logisticians in general need info that is not that tough to get. Most places we go, there are ongoing operations so we can recycle information and update it. If you are in the field and have questions you are going to answer them by interacting with colleagues and partners. In most cases, a website is hard to access and decisions need to be made quickly with local and current knowledge."*

Snoad agreed and acknowledged that the team had been working on the impression that their audience was field logisticians. But:

> *"They are an audience under pressured, connectivity and their habits in getting information require a different strategy of disseminating and reporting. We were adding value for those at regional headquarters. During the day, people in the field didn't plan on looking at the web. If you need to coordinate immediately, you don't stop to look at the web."*

This doubt was confirmed when they began to understand that those most willing to share information were sensitive to donors' expectations. In other words, they participated in the website to be visible, and were careful with what they shared. Despite all these reflections Snoad still believed there was a strong potential benefit for the website and the role of IM in general within the UNJLC. They decided to leave the information on the web as a reference to those who will continue to work in Afghanistan. They noted that the information would not be updated after their departure, yet traffic continued to grow and a year later enquiries still came through email.

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[8] Seconded to the UNJLC core team from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). During the Afghanistan operation, he served as the contact person for his organization to the UNJLC.

Second Generation: A New Awakening:

Two weeks after the deployment of operations in Iraq in March 2003, UNJLC web manager Eric Branckaert, received a 3AM telephone call at his flat in Rome from his colleagues in Larnaca, Cyprus. High security concerns had made it imperative that information on the UNJLC Iraq website be urgently updated. There had been a few changes in the operation and new information had to be uploaded to the site and other content removed. Branckaert had joined the team at the end of 2002 to re-design the UNJLC website. His first task was to update the first generation of the website, described above, and to give the site a new look making it more user-friendly. His technical expertise would turn him into the focal point for Information Management development.

Prior to him joining the team, a group of consultants had developed a new website image and format[9] yet the coding was still cumbersome as it was 'flat HTML'. The priority had been to have it as simple to provide quicker and easier access from the field where bandwidth and software may be restrictive. A new website layout and design was launched in March 2003. But even then, under that format, simple changes could take hours to do, and a new page or modification could easily become a half-day's work.

Unlike other deployments, months of preparation had preceded the Iraq mission. Though access to local information had been limited under Saddam Hussein's regime, there had been more time to carry out capacity assessments and inter-agency contingency planning. In parallel, agencies were able to create liaisons and establish pre-deployment roles and contacts.

There was also time to think about the role of information in the UNJLC, as Van der Knaap explained:

> "*During the preparation time we were able to reflect on the profile of IM within the UNJLC and on the target audience and their potential needs. There was something to be said about sharing information for donors' sake, but if that was the only purpose then the UNJLC's mandate for coordination was not being fully met. Good information did not necessarily translate into good coordination. This would only happen when information could facilitate collaboration to maximize the use of resources available in light of the priorities. Humanitarian managers in the field are in closest contact with needs, and thus they are most knowledgeable about priorities. Thus, we had to find a way of working directly with them. Dissemination is the real challenge*"

The whole UNJLC team invested even more time in talking to other agencies in their attempt to identify bottlenecks and conflicts in advance and anticipate crucial points where information was needed. Having this type of information, the website rapidly took on a forward-planning role, providing advice on problems that could arise such as fuel forecasting and management.

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[9] Visit http://www.unjlc.org

Fuel Forecasting[10]

Having identified fuel as a critical area ahead of the Iraqi operation, the UNJLC put together a team of experts with experience in the public, private, military and humanitarian sectors. Together they provided high-quality analyses and forecasts that gave the UNJLC fuel bulletins greater acceptance in the field. As the bulletins gained credibility so too did their profile, landing on the desks of high government officials, in the UN and the US Congress, and were consulted by the world's top newspapers.

John Levins, head of the Iraqi UNJLC Fuel Team explained that in light of the potential for fuel disruptions to seriously affect transport and energy supply, his team had:

> *"...established a unique range of information resources from their own observations in the streets of Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil, to the Ministry of Oil itself, and daily situation reports from the US Army Corps of Engineers Task Force RIO (Restore Iraqi Oil). At the micro level, we spoke to Iraqi housewives waiting in line for liquid petroleum gas (LPG) for cooking and gauged how long people had to wait to refuel their cars. At the macro level, we tracked national production, imports, and tried to alert people that there was probably a lot more smuggling of oil products out of Iraq than was generally assumed."*

> *"Of course, we could never repeat the Ministry or RIO sources verbatim, and we were always very careful not to publish information that could assist saboteurs. But we could summarize and analyze the information, link it with other things we knew, and make sense of it for our readership. For example, we were able to reinforce our conclusion that production of kerosene in the summer would be insufficient to build the necessary stockpiles and that imports would be necessary for the winter, and that LPG was a major issue, as was proved by the Basra riots months later. We tracked black market prices and our estimates of national demand were proved right when long queues of cars at Baghdad petrol stations disappeared once our estimates of overall supply matched our estimate of overall demand."*

Third Generation: Networking Partners

With the operation in Iraq continuing and another starting in Liberia (see Exhibit A), the website became technically almost unmanageable. The technical demands were too high, and information began to suffer major delays for publication. Snoad and Branckaert had been conducting a six-month evaluation of the website, and at this point decided to hire another company to upgrade the website's features. Mid-2004 they launched the third generation of the site in the same domain with several improvements, as Branckaert highlighted:

> *"The design principles were low bandwidth, consistency in look and feel and standard practices in navigation and the search system. From the user's*

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[10] This section has been adapted from INSEAD case study *"Fuelling the Iraq Crisis, 2003-2004: A Study in Humanitarian Fuel Requirements in the Context of Conflict."*

perspective, the advantage of the new system was that it could send them notifications of updates. For us, the new system gave us an intranet and was much easier to use and update. We could create a new page of information in under a minute and a new sub-crisis area in under a day."

Although the layout interface remained mostly unchanged, the website assumed a new design and had a new set of features. Considering the different levels of information and different communication needs, password-protected intranet and extranet sections were developed. The intranet allowed UNJLC team members to communicate and share files with a higher level of privacy. Membership at this level included the ability to post or remove files from the other areas of the website.

The extranet enabled registered members to view and share files that were not visible for 'simple' visitors. Users could personalise their home page to give the most relevant information for their differing needs, and it was hoped that this would increase the website's value for each user. By registering users and being able to track their behaviour online the IM team could gain a better understanding of its viewers and their needs.

The benefits of upgrading the website were demonstrated in the continued efforts in Iraq, Liberia, as well as and in emerging operations in Nepal,[11] Haiti and Sudan. Throughout these operations the UNJLC was able to strengthen partnerships with similar information providers in the field, among which were the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Humanitarian Supply Management System (SUMA).

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

As the central agency for humanitarian coordination, OCHA supported humanitarian operations with two main information tools: the Humanitarian Information Centres (HIC)[12] and ReliefWeb,[13] both of which had valuable synergies with the UNJLC website.

> *"Since the beginning we collaborated with information, links and reports. Currently, we are looking at sharing our tools and server and working more closely in future operations",* claimed Snoad.

Much like the UNJLC website, the HIC provided information to support inter-agency co-ordination and activities on a project basis. Both aim to ensure that individuals and organizations at field, and strategic level have access management tools that would help them to assess, plan, implement and monitor humanitarian assistance. However, UNJLC focuses

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[11] The UNJLC was deployed in Nepal for contingency planning, as the UN acknowledged the threat of a potential major earthquake on the densely populated Kathmandu Valley. A deteriorating security situation in the country, caused by civil strife, hampered the UN's development efforts in Nepal and threatened to provoke a humanitarian disaster.

[12] For more information on the Humanitarian Information Centres (HIC) please visit http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/

[13] ReliefWeb: a portal run by OCHA that serves as an inter-agency repository for documents and information pertaining to humanitarian operations. It is open to all UN agencies and has the active participation of NGOs and field staff. For more information on ReliefWeb please visit http://www.reliefweb.int/

specifically on logistics-related information, and due to its rapid-response capacity and mandate, it tends to be deployed before HIC.

Tracking the Goods (Haiti)

In a parallel attempt to assist with coordination activities through information management, UNJLC had been collaborating since 2002 with the World Health Organization (WHO) and FUNDESUMA[14] on the development of a Logistics Support System (LSS)[15] that would serve as a supply management tool for humanitarian agencies.

The LSS concept stems from the Pan American Health Organization's (PAHO)[16] humanitarian supply management system, SUMA, used to register, track, and distribute donations following disasters. SUMA had been deployed numerous times throughout Latin America and had successfully built transparency and accountability in heavily politicised environments. However, the deployment in Haiti was the first time they would work on the same operation as the UNJLC.

For SUMA, Haiti represented a new phase in its development, as it was here that the organisation would introduce an updated version of its system that would permit real-time reporting of donations registered at the entry points in the supply chain. This information, reported on the Internet, enabled donors and recipients alike to know what goods had been provided, when they would arrive, who were the recipients, and eventually, to assess which needs had been met and which remained.

In Haiti, UNJLC provided a link to SUMA on its website. This was useful, as Jeronimo Venegas, head of the SUMA team in Haiti, remarked:

> *"The strength of our system is how we manage the influx of goods at the warehouse level. In Latin America, unsolicited donations and large numbers of donors tend to be an issue. Therefore warehouse management becomes an extremely important issue, which is what we do best.*
>
> *The UNJLC's focus is the overall logistics, thus the information with which UNJLC works complements ours as it sets the basis for how, when and where the goods should be taken and identifies bottlenecks, transport providers, tracking prices, fuel, and exchange rates. That job is outside our reach.*
>
> *What we do best is tell people what is coming in, or leaving the warehouse, while they can tell people how to best reach the destinations."*

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[14] Costa-Rican NGO responsible for the management of the SUMA, the Pan American Health Organization's Humanitarian Supply Management System. For more information on SUMA refer to INSEAD Case Study No. 10/2003-5145 *"Coordinating Disaster Logistics after El Salvador's Earthquakes using SUMA's Humanitarian Supply Management System."*

[15] To be released in 2005.

[16] Regional office of the World Health Organization (WHO). For more information please visit http://www.paho.org

In terms of information, the biggest difference between the two was that SUMA's information was readily accessible at the entry points (*i.e.* raw data about cargo offloaded at entry points and released for distribution from the warehouse). UNJLC on the other hand had to take an active role in requesting data from certain members of the community within which they were operating. For UNJLC, the data gathering process required a more decentralized and proactive engagement than SUMA.

Not Just Data, But Knowledge

The UNJLC's objective was to coordinate the efforts of humanitarian agencies, reduce duplication and maximize resources (such as time, money, goods, transportation, human capital, etc). Providing timely, relevant, and accurate information was a great help to all, however through the deployments the UNJLC team realized that the role of IM within UNJLC was beyond that of simple data processing or an information provider. IM had to be central in supporting the UNJLC's *raison d'être* and this had to be communicated not only to users, but also to an external audience. As Snoad clarified:

> *"Gathering and processing data to publish information was only half of our job and the work would be incomplete if that is all we did…The real goal is that viewers could use the information given to build their knowledge of the situation and with it, take effective action in the field."*

For example, data such as fuel prices, road distances, flight schedules, or truck rates could be posted directly onto the website. Even though it saved users time to have data centralized and posted, considering the cost/benefit ratio to all parties, at this level of simple data publishing, the UNJLC's impact on the whole operation was minimal.

On the other hand, processing the data by making logical links could provide valuable information. For example, "road transport from A to B costs agency UNXYZ US$1234/MT/100km." Stakeholders would confirm or challenge this with examples from their own experiences. In general, the UNJLC's contribution was to create awareness of reasonable regional standards (*i.e.* the cost of transporting goods in Afghanistan, cost of fuel per region, warehousing in neighboring countries) and to help organizations and governments anticipate problems before they actually happened. For example, predicting a fuel shortage in Iraq based on observed demand and estimated supply. All this information would be published on the website in bulletins or in tables linked to the home page (Exhibit B). These reports were available from the website archive, via e-mail, or in hard copies upon request.

Through more examples, and discussions at the inter-agency logistics meetings the bulletin reports could promotes learning that in turns becomes knowledge. By providing and analyzing a series of examples from the field, agencies could arrive at conclusions such as: "US$1234/MT/100km is very high, it's only around US$500/MT/100km on a similar route further south…there might be price fixing." This was very helpful in Afghanistan during a period in which the UNJLC played an important role in dissolving a trucking cartel. Prices had been rising rapidly and were in some cases, two or three times the original value. By posting, and disseminating information on the standard rates for transportation and the fuel

conditions, UNJLC was able to give stakeholders an advantage in negotiating with suppliers so that costs were not inflated.[17]

The UNJLC aimed to help agencies understand that if they consolidated cargo, or negotiated jointly they could lower prices and/or improve delivery times. If this step was reached, then IM was clearly supporting the UNJLC mandate and objectives, while adding the greatest potential value to all those involved. One of the key successes took place in Afghanistan when the agencies agreed to share information about their transportation requirements and needs so that the UNJLC could coordinate the use of available space in trucks and planes. Another great example has been the creation of different maps[18] in Sudan with information about road capacity, accessibility, population, and much more. These smart maps with embedded data quickly found their way to the walls and desks of the entire humanitarian community in one of the world's largest humanitarian relief efforts.

The Path Ahead

During the UNJLC's quarterly meeting, the core team began their review of the different forthcoming activities and direction for the upcoming operations. IM enjoyed a greater role and had found a niche in the agenda during the different operations of 2003 and various website developments. In his speech to the group Snoad pointed out:

> *"We have to prove that we add value to people: make it so natural for people to come to us that it becomes a habit. We try to make it appear to all our partners that we are an internal, rather than an independent, service for them in an inter-agency capacity. We have removed all branding (logos) and have let the website's design be the branding so it's more acceptable for the agencies to put our maps on the wall and take it to meetings.*

> *Part of our goal should be to break the information silos within each participating humanitarian organisation. The process by which we do it is more important than the content. We can't wait for them to ask us what they need, we need to ask them. We need to ask people not only what information they need, but also what information they have and can provide. We don't want to replicate efforts, so we may go as far as considering how they already share information and link up with that."*

> *To share, people have to believe in it. They may be motivated to share when they need to know what others have, but that assumes they recognise a need to coordinate. In some larger humanitarian organisations you have the full spectrum of information internally, so information sharing with outsiders and collaboration becomes a burden and a sensitive topic. Many NGOs are on the opposite side of that coin, more outward looking, yet there are always groups that remain in pockets of isolation. So we have to develop different strategies to get the different people involved in sharing.*

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[17]　For more information see INSEAD Case Study on Afghanistan Crisis (op cit)

[18]　See Exhibit C or   http://www.unjlc.org/content/index.phtml/itemId/15950 for a complete list of maps on Sudan.

The goal is to add value now, but the long-term game is to make people see the UNJLC as the first port of call for logistics info by partnering and sharing information with reliable sources and giving our users and field logisticians a valuable way to participate in our website The ultimate challenge is to disseminate properly through the most efficient channels so that we can reach people with what interests them the most."

Exhibit A

UNJLC Timeline

Date	Events/Deployments
1996-97	East Zaire Crisis
1997	OCHA organizes an inter-agency meeting to discuss UNJLC concept with the different heads of logistics
1998	Somalia Floods
Spring 1999	Balkan Crisis
End 1999	East Timor Crisis
March 2000	Mozambique Floods
January 2001	Mozambique Floods
February 2001	Bhuj Earthquake
March 2001	UNJLC Endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). To be developed by WFP
Summer 2001	Democratic Republic of Congo Crisis
September 2001	Afghanistan Crisis/First Generation of the UNJLC Website
March 2002	IASC institutionalized UNJLC within the UN System
March 2003	Iraq Crisis Phase 1/ Second Generation of the Website
August 2003	Liberia Crisis
September 2003	End of Phase 1 for Iraq Mission
March 2004	End of Liberian Mission
March 2004	Sudan Crisis
June 2004	Second Phase of Iraq Mission
July 2004	Haiti Floods Crisis
August 2004	End of Haitian Mission
September 2004	Annual Quarterly Meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark

Exhibit B
Bulletin Sample

Extracted from the UNJLC Website Archives (www.unjlc.org)

Bulletin 13 UNJLC Iraq
23rd May 2003

UNJLC Iraq
Bulletin No 13
as of 23 May 2003

UNJLC bulletins aim to provide a concise weekly overview of UNJLC activities and the current logistical situation in regard to the crisis in the Middle East. In addition, sector/country specific reports will be released regularly in order to provide in-depth coverage of priority areas.

The password restrictions have been lifted from the UNJLC website www.unjlc.org, on which full details of all items mentioned in the bulletin below are available. Contact details for all UNJLC offices are available on the UNJLC website.

- 1. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS
- 2. SECURITY
- 3. AIR OPERATIONS
- 4. BORDER CROSSING AND CUSTOMS
- 5. TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE
- 6. LOGISTICS COORDINATION
- 7. CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION
- 8. FUEL
- 9. OTHER

1. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

On the 22nd May, the Security Council adopted a resolution lifting sanctions imposed on Iraq and allowing for full resumption of oil sales in order to restore economic activity for reconstruction.
Effective from 26th of May, all medicines imported to Iraq must have prior approval from the Iraqi Minister of Health.
A Boeing 737, 100-seat aircraft arrived in Amman on 21 May and flew its first scheduled flight on the 22nd May.
The Coalition has indicated that Al Kut airport (southeast of Baghdad) may soon be available for humanitarian flights
UNJLC and UNHAS (including the booking office) will be re-locating from Larnaca, Cyprus to Amman, Jordan during the coming week.

2. SECURITY

Iraq: All three **Northern** Governorates are classified as security phase 4. The Security Management Team (SMT) is recommending that the whole area be downgraded to phase 3. The **Southern** area is still in phase 4. Banditry and looting remain the biggest security threat in Iraq. Some NGOs are requesting permission to use weapons as a means of defence against looters. The NGO, German Association for Development, has produced a document entitled "Minimum standards regarding staff security in humanitarian aid" which discusses security issues for the humanitarian community. This document is available at www.venro.org/publikationen/archiv/personalsicherheit_engl.pdf
Jordan: The country is classified security phase 2. During the past week there has been a tightening of security and increased screening of cargo at the Al-Karamah border after reports that antiques and manuscripts are being smuggled out of Iraq. As a result, border delays are expected for traffic not using the dedicated humanitarian cargo lane.
Kuwait: The country remains at security phase 2
Syria: The country remains at security phase 1. Despite the spate of recent suicide bombings in the region, the overall threat assessment remains low. UN staff have been instructed to remain vigilant.
Turkey: The country is at security phase 1 in South East.

Exhibit B (Cont'd)

3. AIR OPERATIONS

The Coalition has indicated that Al Kut airport (southeast of Baghdad) may soon be available for humanitarian flights.
At present, Basrah International, Baghdad International, Bashur, Kirkuk, Erbil, Mosul (only for C130 or smaller aircraft) and Basrah Airports are all operational.
The NGO, AirServ, has recommenced flights to **Erbil** on the 20th May after one week of suspended operations.
At the **Erbil Airport**, UNJLC has negotiated (through the Civil Military Operations Centre) the use of a dedicated storage area. The area can be used to store up to 30 fuel barrels, a forklift, pallets and other handling equipment. UNJLC has conducted a high level infrastructure assessment of the airfield that will be posted on the UNJLC website over the next few days. Finally, UNDP has provided a 10-ton forklift for cargo handling at the airport.
UNHAS is centralising all aircraft assets (except the IL 76) to operate from Marka airport in Amman, **Jordan.**
As of last week, an UNHAS AN 12 is available for cargo purposes.
A Boeing 737, 100-seat aircraft arrived in Amman on the 21st May and completed its first scheduled flight on the 22nd May. The aircraft will fly from Amman three times a week serving Erbil, Basrah and Kuwait. Flights will also be conducted between Amman and Larnaca three times a week.
UNHAS is now routinely operating flights into Iraq although the planned flights are still subject to change at short notice in response to Coalition rescheduling requests.
The **Beechcraft 1900** will continue carrying small numbers of passengers from Amman to Baghdad six days a week, except Friday.
The weekly UNHAS flight schedules are posted on the UNJLC website at http://www.unjlc.org/iraq/air/02_01.html.
Effective from 26th of May, all medicines imported to Iraq must have prior approval from the Iraqi Minister of Health. The Donation Application Form and Medical Donation Policy document have been posted at the RAMCC website http://www.centaf.af.mil/ramcc. Detailed documentation of the import procedures have not yet been provided by the Coalition.
UNHAS, including the booking office, will be re-locating from Larnaca, Cyprus to Amman, Jordan during the coming week.

4. BORDER CROSSING AND CUSTOMS

On the 22nd May, the Security Council adopted a resolution lifting sanctions imposed on Iraq and allowing for full resumption of oil sales in order to restore economic activity for reconstruction. This is likely to create a huge increase in cross border traffic and a tightening of the customs procedures in the short to medium term.
In **Jordan**, the Al-Karamah border crossing remains open to humanitarian traffic. In addition to opening a cargo lane dedicated to humanitarian traffic, the Jordanian authorities have also increased the number of customs officers to expedite the flow of traffic. WFP is currently sending 5,000MT a day into Iraq (200 trucks daily). UNESCO is sending 100 containers into Iraq over the next two weeks.
The UN is still waiting for official clarification from the Jordanian ministry of foreign affairs on the **Iraqi visa situation** which remains unclear despite reports from numerous NGOs that border crossings are possible without visas.
For humanitarian organisations who are transporting goods through the **Syrian** borders of Yaroubiah and Al Tanf, customs declarations can be made through the Danzas clearing agent, who has positioned officers to assist with customs clearance.
A recent Syrian news report suggesting that commercial traffic can now cross the border into Iraq has been found to be misleading.
The **Kuwaiti/Iraq** border crossing at Safwan remains open for humanitarian and coalition traffic only. There has been a dramatic increase in the amount of contractor traffic entering Iraq as part of the drive to rebuild infrastructure in the south. The Umm Qasr crossing is still closed.
In **Turkey**, UNOCHI reports that approximately 200 trucks per day carrying food aid are crossing the Silopi border into Iraq. Despite the lowering of the security phase in Turkey, security clearance is still required to cross the border. Humanitarian organisations wishing to transit goods through Turkey into Iraq must contact the UN Office of the Iraq Programme (OIP) in New York. More information is available at http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/index.html

5. TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE

In **Iraq**, USAID reports that the Al Rutbah bridge, 174km east of the Jordan/Iraq border, will be closed and the traffic diverted through Al-Rutbah town. This temporary measure will be in effect while the bridge is undergoing reconstruction, during the next few months.
In **Syria**, the Director of Railway Transport in Damascus has reported to UNJLC that the Syrian/Iraqi railway network is fully operational. The network has reportedly a capacity of up to 10,000MT per day. UNJLC will assess feasibility of future use of the railway. Negotiations are currently underway to lower the transport rates currently offered by the Railway. A map of the Iraqi rail network is available on the UNJLC website.

Exhibit B (Cont'd)

6. LOGISTICS COORDINATION

In **Basrah**, warehouse security remains a concern. The central warehouse, belonging to the Ministry of Trade, and shared by the British Army, WFP and ICRC, is suffering from daily looting despite a permanent presence of British troops inside the compound. UN agencies and NGOs have requested UNJLC to identify secure warehousing in the area. UN Habitat has requested UNJLC to identify possible receivers for their humanitarian cargo in Basrah.
UNJLC **Erbil** is organising regular joint logistics meetings starting on the 24th May.
In **Syria**, UNJLC has been organising meetings between forwarding agents, Government representatives and the NGO community to present information on the condition of the transport infrastructure in Iraq.

7. CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION
Nothing to report

8. FUEL

A first group of 220 Armed Police, tasked with providing security at the Southern Oil Company have now taken over from UK Forces. The police force is expected to grow to 9,000 in total.
The importation programme of LPG and gasoline has not had a significant impact on the local market. The Coalition has adopted a new approach and is attempting to use a 30,000 ton vessel to deliver the necessary fuel. This fuel will be directly pumped into the North/South pipeline which will feed all connected towns.
This should have significant impact on cross-border movements reducing traffic congestion and delays at the border.

9. OTHER

ORHA has revised it's area coordination structure. The northern part of Iraq now includes **seven** governorates – the existing five - Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaimaniyah, At-Tameem and Niniveh and the two additions of Salah ad-Din and Diyala.
UNHAS and UNJLC Larnaca will relocate to Amman on the 27th May.
UNJLC Basrah, Erbil, Mosul, Baghdad are now established.
UNDP Syria is now issuing ID cards to UN staff.

Exhibit C
UNJLC Maps of Sudan

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